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ABSTRACT
In late 2019, the gravest pandemic in a century began spreading across the world. A state of
uncertainty related to what has become known as SARS-CoV-2 has since fueled conspiracy narratives
on social media about the origin, transmission and medical treatment of and vaccination against
the resulting disease, COVID-19. Using social media intelligence to monitor and understand the
proliferation of conspiracy narratives is one way to analyze the distribution of misinformation on the
pandemic. We analyzed more than 9.5M German language tweets about COVID-19. The results
show that only about 0.6% of all those tweets deal with conspiracy theory narratives. We also
found that the political orientation of users correlates with the volume of content users contribute
to the dissemination of conspiracy narratives, implying that partisan communicators have a higher
motivation to take part in conspiratorial discussions on Twitter. Finally, we showed that contrary to
other studies, automated accounts do not significantly influence the spread of misinformation in the
German speaking Twitter sphere. They only represent about 1.31% of all conspiracy-related activities
in our database.
Keywords social networks · misinformation · conspiracy theory · political polarization
1 Introduction
In November 2019, a febrile respiratory illness caused by SARS-CoV-2 infected people in the city of Wuhan, China. On
January 30th 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the spread of the virus a worldwide pandemic[BBC,
2020]. Shortly after, the WHO reported multiple COVID-19-related knowledge gaps relating to its origin, transmission,
vaccinations, clinical considerations, and concerns regarding the safety of healthcare workers[WHO, 2020a]. The
organization warned of an “infodemic”, defined by “an overabundance of information and the rapid spread of misleading
or fabricated news, images, and videos”[WHO, 2020b]. By August 2020, more than 22 million people worldwide
had contracted the virus[WHO, 2020c]. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) put
forward estimates of negative GDP growth for all member countries in 2020 due to the crisis [OECD, 2020].
COVID-19’s indomitable dissemination around the globe combined with a lack of effective medical remedies [Guo
et al., 2020; Xie et al., 2020] and its psychological and economic side effects [OECD, 2020; Ho et al., 2020; Rajkumar,
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2020; Frank et al.] have left many people to uncertainty and fear of further developments. Previous research has shown
that lack of certainty and control often results in the emergence and circulation of conspiracy theory narratives [Whitson
and Galinsky, 2008]. Popper defined conspiracy mentality as the “mistaken theory that, whatever happens in society –
especially happenings such as war, unemployment, poverty, shortages, which people as a rule dislike – is the result of
direct design by some powerful individuals and groups”[Popper, 2002]. This one-sided or even pathological method of
reasoning regularly facilitates coping with uncertainty and fear by making the world more understandable and providing
individuals with an illusion of control [Kruglanski et al., 2006].
There are two main conditions conducive to the emergence of conspiracy narratives: individuals’ psychological traits
and socio-political factors. Regarding psychological traits, numerous laboratory studies demonstrate the correlation
between conspiracy beliefs and psychological features like negative attitude toward authorities [Imhoff and Bruder,
2014], self-esteem [Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999], paranoia and threat [Mancosu et al., 2017], powerlessness [Abalakina-
Paap et al., 1999], education, gender and age [van Prooijen, 2017], level of agreeableness [Swami et al., 2011], and
death-related anxiety [Newheiser et al., 2011]. Another part of reasoning sees conspiracy mentality as a generalized
political attitude [Imhoff and Bruder, 2014] and correlates conspiracy beliefs to socio-political factors like political
orientation. Enders et al. showed that conspiracy beliefs can be a product of partisanship [Enders et al., 2020]. Several
other studies show a quadratic correlation between partisanship and the belief in certain conspiracy theories [van
Prooijen et al., 2015]. These insights imply that extremists on both sides of the political spectrum are more prone to
believe in and to discuss conspiracy narratives.
We define conspiracy narratives as part of the overall phenomenon of misinformation on the internet. We use
misinformation as the broader concept of fake or inaccurate information that is not necessarily intentionally produced
(distinguished from disinformation which is regularly based on the intention to mislead the recipients). Among all the
conspiracy narratives, we are interested in those propagated in times of pandemic crises. The spread of health-related
conspiracy theories is not a new phenomenon [Geissler and Sprinkle, 2013; Bogart et al., 2010; Klofstad et al., 2019]
but seems to be even accelerated in world connected via social media.
The COVID-19 pandemic’s unknown features, its psychological and economical side effects, the ubiquitous availability
of Online Social Networks (OSNs)[Pew, 2019], and high levels of political polarization in many countries [Fletcher
et al., 2020; Yang et al., 2016] make this pandemic a potential breeding ground for the spread of conspiracy narratives.
From the outset of the crisis, “misleading rumors and conspiracy theories about the origin circulated the globe paired
with fear-mongering, racism, and the mass purchase of face masks[...]. The social media panic travelled faster than the
COVID-19 spread” [Depoux et al., 2020]. Such conspiracy narratives can obstruct the efforts to properly inform the
general public via medical and scientific findings [Grimes, 2016]. Therefore, investigating the origins and circulation
of conspiracy narratives as well as the potential political motives supporting their spread on OSNs is of vital public
relevance. With this objective, we analyzed more than 9.5M German language tweets about COVID-19 to answer the
following research questions:
Research Question 1: What volume of German speaking Twitter activities comprises COVID-19 conspiracy discussions
and how much of this content is removed from Twitter?
Research Question 2: Does the engagement with COVID-19 conspiracy narratives on Twitter correlate with political
orientation of users?
Research Question 3: To what degree do automated accounts contribute to the circulation of conspiracy narratives in
the German speaking Twitter sphere?
2 Data
We collected the data for this study during the early phase of the crisis, namely, between March 11th, the day on
which the WHO declared the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus a pandemic[BBC, 2020] and May 31st, 2020. The data
was downloaded using the Twitter’s Streaming API by looking for the following keywords: “COVID”, “COVID-19”,
“corona”, and “coronavirus”. Only Tweets posted by German speaking users or with German language were included.
The final dataset comprises more than 9.5M tweets from which two categories of conspiracy narratives were selected:
conspiracy narratives about the origin of the COVID-19 illness (Table 1) and those about its potential treatments (Table
2). The conspiracy narratives about the origin of the COVID-19 illness were selected based on Shahsavari et al.,
who automatically detected the significant circulation of the underlying conspiracy theories on Twitter using machine
learning methods [Shahsavari et al., 2020]. The second group of conspiracy narratives were chosen based on the fact
that they were in the center of attention in German media [Tagesschau, 2020] and thus a considerable number of tweets
discussed them [Netzpolitik, 2020].
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Table 1: Conspiracy narratives about the origin of COVID-19
case description
5G conspiracy narrative suggesting that the 5G network activates the virus
Bill Gates conspiracy narrative suggesting that Bill Gates aims to use COVID-19 to initiate a global
surveillance regime
Wuhan laboratory conspiracy theory narrative suggesting that the virus originates from a laboratory in
Wuhan, China
Table 2: Conspiracy narratives about potential treatments of COVID-19
case description
Ibuprofen conspiracy narrative suggesting that Ibuprofen reduces COVID-19 symptoms
Homoeopathy conspiracy narrative suggesting that homeopathy medicines reduce COVID-19 symp-
toms
Malaria conspiracy narrative suggesting that a malaria drug is an antiviral against SARS-CoV-2
virus
Table 3 indicates the number of tweets belonging to each conspiracy narrative and the keywords that are used to filter
them out1. There were 68,466 tweets in total discussing the underlying conspiracy narratives. Figure 1 shows the
timeline of the tweets.
Table 3: Number of tweets for each conspiracy narrative
case number of tweets keywords
5G 5,762 5G, #5g
Bill Gates 24,653 Bill Gates, #billgates
Wuhan laboratory 9,366 #wuhanlab Wuhan Lab
Ibuprofen 7,016 Ibuprofen, #ibuprofen
Homeopathy 4,714 Homöopath, #Homöopath
Malaria 7,955 Malaria, #malaria
Control group 9,000 __
In addition to the six conspiracy narratives, 9000 tweets were randomly extracted from the dataset and served as a
control group.
To answer research question 2, a list was extracted from official party websites; this list contains members of parliament
(MPs) who are active on Twitter and belong to one of the six political parties in Germany’s federal legislature. Each
party runs several official Twitter pages that were added to the list of Twitter pages of each political party; for example,
the official Twitter page of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the federal state of Bavaria, called “BayernSPD”, was
added to the SPD list. For each twitter account in the extracted list a maximum of 4000 tweet handles were downloaded
from the Twitter API. Table 4 shows the relevant statistics on the political tweets.
Table 4: Number of political tweets extracted from politicians’ twitter pages
political party number of MPs on Twitter number of extra official
Twitter pages
total number of tweet han-
dles
AfD 27 14 68,789
CDU/CSU 131 18 220,768
FDP 56 7 96,046
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 56 11 169,864
Linke 50 12 155,794
SPD 110 17 221,029
In the next step, for each of the 68,466 users spreading conspiracy narratives (Table 3) the lists of their tweet handles
were downloaded (Table 5). Finally, for each of them we counted the number of times they retweeted one of the political
tweets in table 4. Based on Boyd et al. retweets are mainly a form of endorsement [Boyd et al., 2010]. Therefore, we
1We used “homöopath” in order to match both German words “homöopathie” and “homöopathisch”
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Figure 1: Daily number of tweets for each conspiracy narrative
assume if a user collects a discernible number of retweets from members of a certain political party, this user will most
likely share the corresponding political orientation. This method of inference about the political orientation of users has
been applied in similar studies [Garimella et al., 2017].
Table 5: Number of tweets extracted from users spreading conspiracy narrative tweets
case number of tweets number of downloaded tweets from
the contributing users
5G 5762 10,967,158
Bill Gates 24653 35,144,536
Wuhan laboratory 9366 14,332,403
Ibuprofen 7016 14,855,267
Homoeopathy 4714 7,746,555
Malaria 7955 16,258,164
Control group 9000 12,217,082
3 Results
There are multiple studies showing that exposure to misinformation can lead to persistent negative effects on citizens.
The respondents in a study adjusted their judgment proportional to their cognitive ability after they realized that their
initial evaluation was based on inaccurate information. In other words, respondents with lower levels of cognitive
ability tend to keep biased judgments even after exposure to the truth [Keersmaecker and Roets, 2017]. In another
study, Tangherlini et al. found that conspiracy narratives stabilize based on the alignment of various narratives, domains,
people, and places such that the removal of one or some of these entities would cause the conspiracy narrative to quickly
fall apart [Tangherlini et al., 2020]. Imhoff and Lamberty have shown that believing COVID-19 to be a hoax negatively
correlated with compliance with self-reported, infection-reducing, containment-related behavior [Imhoff and Lamberty,
2020].
On that account, to assess a democratic information ecosystem that is balanced rather towards reliable information
than misinformation we need to monitor and estimate if COVID-19 conspiracy theory narratives circulate significantly
on Twitter. Based on a survey in mid-March 2020, about 48% of respondents stated that they have seen some pieces
of likely misinformation about COVID-19[Pew, 2020]. Shahsavari et al. used automated machine learning methods
to automatically detect COVID-19 conspiracy narratives on Reddit, 4Chan, and news data [Shahsavari et al., 2020].
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Multiple other studies found evidence of COVID-19 misinformation spread on different OSNs [Boberg et al., 2020;
Ahmed et al., 2020; Serrano et al., 2020].
To address the public concerns many of the service providers claimed that they will remove or tag this sort of content
on their platforms. On March 16th 2020, Facebook, Microsoft, Google, Twitter and Reddit said they are teaming up
to combat COVID-19 misinformation on their platforms[Bloomberg, 2020]. On April 22nd, Twitter stated that they
have removed over 2230 tweets containing misleading and potentially harmful COVID-19-related content[Twitter,
2020]. On June 7th 2020, we examined how many of the German conspiracy-related tweets still exist on Twitter in
order to understand if conspiracy-related tweets tend to exist on Twitter for a longer period of time compared to non
conspiracy-related tweets. Table 6 shows the results.
Table 6: Share of conspiracy narratives among all COVID-19 tweets
case number of tweets share (among all 9.5M
COVID-19 tweets)
share deleted on 7th June
2020
5G 5762 0.06% 6%
Bill Gates 24653 0.25% 7%
Wuhan laboratory 9366 0.098% 9%
Ibuprofen 7016 0.073% 14%
Homoeopathy 4714 0.049% 3%
Malaria 7955 0.083% 5%
Control group 9000 0.094% 6%
3.1 Research Question 1
Based on Table 6, only about 0.61% of all COVID-19 German tweets are about one of the conspiracy narratives under
consideration. These German tweets are posted by more than 36,000 unique Twitter users. While 0.61% is small in
magnitude, it still comprises a relevant number of citizens. It is important to note though that this finding does not imply
that only about 36,000 Twitter users believe in conspiracy theories. While our data shows the spread of conspiracy
narratives, they do not reveal a user’s stance towards the respective content. In terms of content moderation by Twitter,
on average 7.3% of conspiracy narrative tweets are deleted after a certain period of time which is significantly higher
than 6% of tweets in the control group. We speculate that more of the conspiracy-related tweets are deleted because
of Twitter’s content moderation efforts that have been enforced due to recent public debates about misinformation on
OSNs.
3.2 Research Question 2
There is a long list of laboratory studies that show a correlation between conspiracy mentality and extreme political
orientation [Enders et al., 2020; van Prooijen et al., 2015]. In this study we answer the slightly different question if the
partisanship of Twitter users correlates with their contribution to conspiracy theory narrative discussions. Table 7 shows
the distribution of the political orientations of users who discuss each of the underlying conspiracy narratives.
Table 7: Political orientation of users discussing conspiracy narratives
case AfD CDU/ CSU FDP Bündnis
90/Die
Grünen
Linke SPD Unknown
5G 11% 3% 3% 8% 10% 14% 51%
Bill Gates 16% 3% 3% 8% 12% 14% 44%
Wuhan lab-
oratory
27% 3% 15% 7% 5% 8% 35%
Ibuprofen 9% 3% 3% 8% 9% 16% 52%
Homoeopathy 5% 4% 6% 13% 15% 24% 33%
Malaria 10% 2% 2% 5% 6% 11% 64%
Control
group
10% 2% 2% 4% 6% 10% 66%
Table 7 demonstrates that users who are likely to be supporters of AfD and SPD most actively discuss and spread
COVID-related conspiracy narratives on Twitter. To check if contributions to conspiracy narratives are correlated with
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the political orientation of users, we ran a saturated Poisson log-linear model on the contingency Table 7. The model
defines the counts as independent observations of a Poisson random variable and includes the linear combination and
the interaction between conspiracy narratives and the political orientation of users [Agresti, 2003].
log(µij) = λ+ λ
N
i + λ
P
j + λ
NP
ij (1)
where µij = E(nij) represents the expected counts, λs are parameters to be estimated and N and P stand for Narrative
and Political Orientation. λNPij s corresponds to the interaction and association between conspiracy narratives and also
reflects the departure from independence [Agresti, 2003]. Since we suspect that beliefs in certain mutually contradictory
conspiracy theories can be positively correlated [Wood et al., 2012], we aggregated the six conspiracy theory cases to
two based on to which category they belong and formed Table 8 to remove any possible correlation.
Table 8: Political orientation of users who discuss two conspiracy narratives (absolute counts)
case AfD CDU/ CSU FDP Bündnis
90/Die
Grünen
Linke SPD Unknown
Origins of
COVID-19
4133 694 1396 1873 2449 3028 10296
Possible
treatments
of COVID-
19
1263 432 497 1149 1347 2330 7841
Table 9 shows the ANOVA analysis of the underlying saturated Poisson log-linear model applied on Table 8. The
last line of resulting p-values in Table 9 shows that in interaction parameter, µij = E(nij), is statistically significant.
Therefore, we can reject the hypothesis that the contribution to conspiracy narratives is independent of the political
orientation of users. The fact that there is evidence of a correlation between the contribution to conspiracy narratives
and the political orientation of users, however, does not imply any causality.
Table 9: ANOVA of Poisson log-linear model on the contingency Table 7
Df Deviance Resid. Df Resid. Dev Pr(>Chi)
NULL 13 31332.82
narrative 1 2115.49 12 29217.32 0.0000
party 6 28294.31 6 923.02 0.0000
narrative:party 6 923.02 0 0.00 0.0000
To further estimate the relative effect of political orientation on the contribution to conspiracy narratives on Twitter, we
applied six Chi-Square goodness of fit tests on the control group and each of the other six conspiracy narratives. For all
of the six tests the p-values were significantly less than 0.05, which suggests that the distributions of the contribution
to the six different conspiracy narratives are statistically different compared to the control group. Figure 2 shows the
distribution of the tests’ residuals. The last column of Figure 2 shows that the Twitter users without a certain political
orientation contributed relatively less to conspiracy narratives in comparison to the control group. In other words,
compared to the control group, users with certain political orientations contributed more to the circulation of conspiracy
narratives.
3.3 Research Question 3
Automated accounts, or users who post programmatically, make up a significant amount of between 9% and 15%
of Twitter users worldwide [Davis et al., 2016]. Multiple studies hold automated accounts responsible for political
manipulation and undue influence on the political agenda [Shao et al., 2017; Ferrara et al., 2016]. However, more
recent studies shed light on these previous results and showed that the influence of automated accounts is overestimated.
Ferrara finds that automated accounts comprise less than 10% of users who post generally about COVID-19 [Ferrara,
2020].
There are multiple methods to automatically detect automated accounts on OSNs [Alothali et al., 2018]. For this study,
we used the method developed by Davis et al. [Davis et al., 2016]. They applied random forest classification trees on
more than a thousand public meta-data available using the Twitter API and on other human engineered features. Table
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Figure 2: Distribution of residuals of Chi-Square goodness of fit tests
10 displays the percentage of automated accounts (users with Complete Automation Probability higher than 0.5) and
verified users who contribute to conspiracy narratives.
Table 10: Ratio of tweets posted by automated and verified users
case share of tweets posted by ver-
ified users
share of tweets posted by au-
tomated accounts
Ratio of automated accounts
to verified users
5G 3.141% 1.578% 0.5
Bill Gates 1.85% 1.358% 0.73
Wuhan laboratory 9.065% 1.3% 0.14
Ibuprofen 3.349% 1.386% 0.41
Homoeopathy 1.039% 0.921% 0.89
Malaria 4.626% 1.343% 0.29
Control group 4.644% 0.89% 0.19
Based on this analysis, 1.31% of COVID-19 conspiracy narrative tweets are suspected to be posted by automated
accounts. This number is significantly lower than many other studies on bot activities on Twitter. We speculate that
this occurs due to three reasons. First, the importance of the topic might have captured a lot of public attention, so
that significantly more users discuss COVID-19-related topics compared to usual Twitter discussions. Second, many
service providers, including Twitter, have started to combat COVID-19 misinformation because of widespread warnings.
Finally, we have concentrated on German tweets while the past estimates apply to tweets in English.
4 Discussions and limitations
In this study we analyzed more than 9.5M German language tweets and showed that the volume of tweets that discuss
one of the six considered conspiracy narratives represents about 0.6% of all COVID-19 tweets. This translates to more
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than 36,000 unique German speaking Twitter users. Imhoff and Lamberty found that “believing that COVID-19 was
a hoax was a strong negative prediction of containment-related behaviors like hand washing and keeping physical
distance”. To provide the public with accurate information about the importance of such measures, social media
intelligence can help elevate potential pitfalls of the Twitter information ecosystem.
Using more than 38,000 tweets and 36,000 unique Twitter users, we formed the contingency table of political orientation
and of contribution to COVID-19 conspiracy narratives (Table 8). We then applied a saturated Poisson log-linear
regression and showed that we cannot statistically reject independence among the underlying variables. This implies
partisans have a higher motivation for taking part in COVID-19-related conspiracy discussions. This shows that
politically polarized citizens increase the spread of health misinformation on Twitter.
Finally, we employed an automated accounts detection tool and showed that on average about 1.31% of the users who
discuss COVID-19 conspiracy narratives are potentially automated accounts or bots. This number is much lower than
estimations on general bot activity on Twitter, which is assumed to be up to 15% [Davis et al., 2016; Varol et al., 2017].
This study holds new insights as well as some limitations:
• Our results shed light on the problem of misinformation on Twitter in times of crises for a certain cultural and
language context: Germany. We showed that the political orientation of politically polarized users translates
to higher circulation of health-related conspiracy narratives on Twitter. Further research could compare the
results of this study with other countries and language realms on Twitter.
• We also offer indications between political or ideological partisanship and engagement in the dissemination of
misinformation on Twitter. In this study we examined if political partisanship motivates individuals to take part
in conspiracy discussions. In other words, we did not distinguish between tweets promoting the conspiracy
narratives and those rejecting them. One could extend the analysis and study the effect of partisanship
on promoting conspiracy theories. Further research will also need to combine quantitative data analysis
and qualitative content analysis to better understand the underlying motivations for engaging in conspiracy
communication on OSNs.
• Finally, we offer a more nuanced view on the role of automated tweets regarding a highly emotionally-charged
topic. There are numerous studies showing contradictory estimates of bot activity on OSNs. We found only
about 1.31% of users who spread COVID-19 conspiracy tweets are potentially bots. This number is much
lower than many of those put forward by other researchers. Further research could investigate this result in
order to understand the reasons why this estimation is lower than other case studies.
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